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Abstract: Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not 
propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as 
follows. Section 1 introduces the topic.  Section 2 gives two 
concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the inter-
nalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Sec-
tion 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons 
are mental states.  Section 4 presents two problems for the 
view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two 
problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Sec-
tion 6 argues that reasons are mental states.  Section 7 re-
sponds to objections.
1. Introduction
Here’s an uncontroversial starting point: we believe things for reas-
ons all the time. Not even skeptics need disagree, for they would be 
vindicated if  it  turned out that all  our beliefs were based on bad 
1
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reasons. Of course most of us will disagree with the skeptic on this 
latter point. But I first want to get clearer on our common point of 
agreement. Just what kind of thing are reasons to begin with?
Let’s  reserve  the  term  ‘epistemic  reason’  for  those  reasons 
upon which our beliefs are based. Sometimes I speak of “reasons for 
believing,” intending exactly same meaning. What I call the basis of 
belief, some authors call the “grounds” of belief (Alston 1985, Pryor 
2005).
Confusion abounds in epistemology on our question. Consider 
this passage from Richard Feldman:
[A]  chain  of  reasons  or  an  evidential  chain  …  is  a 
structured sequence of beliefs, each of which is justi-
fied by its predecessors. It is important to notice that 
an evidential chain need not have just one proposi-
tion at each link or level. For example, in tracing out 
the  evidential  chain  associated  with  Careful’s  belief 
[that  Filcher  stole  the  painting],  we might  have the 
facts about the fingerprints and the possession of the 
paintings as the reasons for [Careful’s belief].  There 
will be further reasons for each of these, perhaps in-
volving the results of the fingerprint tests and the like. 
(Feldman 2003: 50, bold emphasis added)1
Within the span of a paragraph we are told that reasons are beliefs, 
propositions, and facts. Consider also these typical passages from 
1 The surrounding context  suggests  that Feldman thinks reasons are 
beliefs, not propositions or facts.
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Peter Klein, valiant proponent of infinitism:
Infinitism  is  like foundationalism  in  holding  that 
there are features of the world … that make a belief a 
reason . . . . Infinitism is  unlike foundationalism be-
cause  infinitism  holds  that  there  are  no  ultimate, 
foundational reasons . . . . [T]he chain of reasons can-
not end with an arbitrary reason—one for which there 
is no further reason . . .  arbitrary  beliefs, beliefs for 
which  no  reason  is  available,  should  be  avoided. 
(Klein 1999: 298 – 299, bold emphasis added)
There  is  an  infinite  chain  of  propositions …  for 
every proposition. But only some chains contain reas-
ons. Hence, not every proposition will have a justifica-
tion because a proposition has a justification only if 
each member of the chain is available as a reason . . . . 
(Klein 1999: 312, bold emphasis added)
Finally consider these passages from James Pryor:
We introduced the notion of  a ground to distinguish 
between cases where you believe P  for good reasons, 
or on grounds that justify you in believing P, and cases 
where you believe P on bad grounds, ones that do not 
justify that belief. What does it take for your belief to 
be grounded on some fact or condition C that you 
are in? (Pryor 2005: 195, bold emphasis added)
Say that some grounds E you have ‘allow’ a possibility 
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q iff the following counterfactual is true: if q obtained, 
you  would  still  possess  the  same  grounds  E.  Many 
skeptical  scenarios  are  incompatible  with  what  we 
purport to know on the basis of our experiences, but 
are “allowed” by those experiences, in this sense. For 
instance, your experiences at the zoo seem to justify 
you in believing that there is a zebra in the pen. This 
belief is incompatible with the hypothesis that the an-
imal in the pen is a mule painted to look like a zebra. 
But that is a hypothesis which is “allowed” by your ex-
periences. If it  were a painted mule in the pen, you 
would  most  likely  be  having  the  same  experiences, 
and hence, the same grounds for believing that there 
is a zebra in the pen. (Pryor 2000: 527, bold emphasis 
added)
So what are epistemic reasons—are they mental states, such as ex-
periences or beliefs? Propositions? Facts? Something else entirely?
Ethicists and action theorists study an analogous question.2 We 
act for reasons all the time too, but what kind of thing are practical 
reasons? The metaphysical territory here is better explored, so I will 
use their taxonomy to guide our inquiry into epistemic reasons. The 
main options are:
Psychologism: All reasons are psychological items.3
2 Alvarez 2005 reviews some recent work.
3 I believe Jonathan Dancy introduced the terms ‘psychologism’ and 
‘anti-psychologism’ into the literature.
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Anti-psychologism:  No  reason  is  a  psychological 
item.
Dualism: Some but not all reasons are psychological 
items.4
Psychological  items  include  mental  states,  events,  processes  and 
mental facts about the subject. We’ll focus on one specific version of 
psychologism and two versions of anti-psychologism. I defend this 
version of psychologism:
Statism:  Reasons are the subject’s  mental states or 
events.5
I critique these versions of anti-psychologism:
Abstractionism: Reasons are the propositional con-
4 Stoutland (1998: 61) appears to advocate this view.
5 Statists include Davidson (1983: 141), Swain (1981: Chapter 3),  Pol-
lock  (1986:  Chapter  5),  Neta  (2002:  669),  and  Bergmann  (2007). 
Sometimes McDowell (1979: Section 5; 1994: 10) says things that put 
him squarely in the statist camp, but other times (e.g. 1994: 36, 39) 
he  sounds  like  a  factualist—reasons  are  “facts,”  “features  of  the 
world,” or “states of affairs.” He informs me that he favors factualism. 
Statism does not rule out McDowell’s (1994: Lecture II) view of empir-
ical content, according to which the content of a perceptual state 
or a true perceptual judgment is literally some external, non-mental 
fact. Combining statism with McDowell’s view of empirical content—
or with Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) extended mind hypothesis—we 
would say that reasons are psychological items, (at least) some of 
which literally contain non-psychological items. Some might view this 
combination as a satisfying way to split the difference between psy-
chologism and anti-psychologism. A potentially attractive version of 
statism, which I do not consider here in detail, says that reasons are 
(token) properties of mental states; this might be Ernest Sosa’s view.
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tents of the subject’s mental states.6 
Factualism: Reasons are non-mental facts or states 
of affairs.7
I won’t explicitly critique dualism, which finds relatively few explicit 
advocates in the literature. But my positive argument in section 6 
works equally well against dualism.
Let me clarify what these are not theories of. They are not the-
ories of reasons that there are to believe Q, which differ importantly 
from epistemic reasons in the sense we are dealing with, for at least 
two reasons.8 First, reasons that there are to believe Q need not be 
had. There might be reasons none of us has to believe that an influ-
enza pandemic will occur. But to believe on the basis of a reason, 
you must have it. Second, reasons that there are to believe Q are al-
ways good reasons to believe Q.9 But you can believe Q on the basis 
6 Abstractionists include Darwall (1983: 31 – 32), Scanlon (1999: 56 – 
57), and Brandom (2000: 18).
7 Factualists  include  Dancy  (2000),  Collins  (1997),  and  McDowell 
(1994). The view as stated needs qualification. Factualists will agree 
that our introspective beliefs are based on mental facts or states, 
but they deem these uninteresting special cases, and insist that this 
qualification does not spoil the spirit of their view. I think this presents 
more of a problem than factualists want to admit, perhaps indicat-
ing that many factualists are ultimately dualists. But I won’t explore 
the matter here.
8 In terminology familiar from the literature on practical reasons, I un-
derstand the competitors as theories of  motivating reasons. I revisit 
the distinction between motivating and normative reasons below in 
section 3.
9 See, e.g., Darwall 1983: 30 – 31, Scanlon 1998: 18 – 19, and Dancy 
2000: Chapter 1. One might say, “There are plenty of reasons to be-
lieve the moon is made of cheese—and they’re all bad!” But to my 
ear, taken literally this sounds like a retraction. I’d cooperatively un-
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of bad reasons.
The competitors are likewise not theories of the  reasons why 
you believe Q. More precisely, none is a general theory of the reas-
ons why.  Epistemic reasons form a proper subset of  the reasons 
why you believe. ‘Why does he think that?’ is potentially ambiguous 
in a way that ‘What’s his reason for thinking that?’ isn’t. Explana-
tions abound for why we believe what we do, not all of which reveal 
our reasons. Consider my victimized twin, ensnared and deceived 
by a powerful evil genius. My twin believes that he is sitting in his 
office. Why does he believe that? One correct answer: because the 
evil genius deceives him. This helps explain his belief, but surely it’s 
not his reason for thinking he’s in his office! Mistaking that for his 
reason leads to the false conclusion that my twin is startlingly irra-
tional.
Another possible view, which I do not here evaluate, is contex-
tualism about reasons (or reason ascriptions). This view states that 
the truth conditions for expressions of the form ‘S’s belief that Q is 
based on R’ or ‘R is S’s reason for believing Q’ vary with features of 
the speaker’s context. In ordinary contexts you could truthfully say 
‘Moore’s belief that he has hands is based on the fact that he has 
hands’. But to speak truthfully in contexts where the possibility of 
perceptual hallucination or systematic deception has been raised, 
derstand it as an ironic or humorous way of saying that there is no 
reason to believe the moon is made of cheese. At the very least, 
there is  a  perfectly  respectable  sense in  which something isn’t  a 
reason at all to believe Q if it isn’t a good reason to believe Q. It is 
this sense I intend.
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you would instead have to say ‘Moore’s belief is based on his experi-
ence as of two hands’.10 You might endorse this view because, on the 
one hand, reasons are explanatory and, on the other, explanation is 
context-sensitive. It would thus be unsurprising if reasons-talk was 
context-sensitive. You could then deploy reasons-contextualism to 
help solve stubborn skeptical puzzles, just as familiar contextualist 
theories in normative epistemology have been. Reasons-contextual-
ism holds at least one advantage over standard contextualist theor-
ies. Whereas the latter typically invoke controversial theses about 
the semantics of ‘knows’ to explain the purported context-sensitiv-
ity of knowledge ascriptions, the former need invoke only the com-
paratively uncontroversial thesis that explanation is context-sensit-
ive (compare Rieber 1998: 194ff and Greco 2003b).11
At least four observations ought to constrain our theory of reas-
ons. First, reasons are explanatory. To say this is not to confuse epi-
stemic reasons with merely causal reasons. When you believe Q for 
a reason, you believe  because of that reason—the reason  explains 
your belief. An adequate theory must respect this. Second, ideally a 
theory should respect the following intuition. Your victimized twin, 
Vic,  recently ensnared by an evil  genius,  undergoes an indefinite 
succession of experiences indistinguishable from yours. Responding 
to the very same kinds of sensory experiences as you, Vic believes 
10 Ram Neta (2003: esp. 21 – 26) says some things that, suitably modi-
fied (he talks of “evidence” rather than “reasons”), might suggest a 
view along these lines.
11 For  standard contextualist  theories,  see  Lewis  1996,  DeRose  1999, 
and Cohen 1998, 2005.
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that he or she is reading an epistemology paper. Intuitively you and 
your  twin  believe  what  you  do  for  the  same  reasons (compare 
Berkeley 1710: §20, Nozick 1981: 184 – 185, Foley 1990: 184, Bon-
Jour  2003:  185 – 186,  Sosa 2003:  150,  and Huemer 2007:  48). 
Third, a theory of reasons should generalize beyond belief and ap-
ply equally  well  to disbelief and withholding.  Fourth,  a theory of 
reasons should not make our job in constructing an adequate norm-
ative epistemology too difficult—for instance, when explaining the 
reasonableness of perceptual beliefs.
As  already  suggested,  I  assume  that  it  is  possible  to  believe 
based on a bad reason. I am more than comfortable letting my argu-
ment  ultimately  rest  on this  assumption,  should it  come to  that 
point. True, sometimes people say a bad reason is “no reason at all.” 
But we understand this to mean that it is not a good reason, just as 
we might respond to a bad argument by saying “that’s not an argu-
ment,” or characterize a mediocre fastball as “no fastball at all,” or 
say that a defective knife is “not a knife.”12 There are bad reasons, 
just as there are bad arguments, mediocre fastballs, and defective 
knives.13
12 Recall  this  memorable  scene  from  the  movie  Crocodile  Dundee 
(1986). Brandishing a switchblade, a mugger threatens Sue Charlton 
and Crocodile Dundee. Sue says to Dundee, “Give him your wallet.” 
Dundee  asks,  “What  for?”  Sue  responds,  “He’s  got  a  knife,” 
whereupon Dundee chuckles,  “That’s  not  a knife,”  draws a giant 
Bowie knife and says, “That’s a knife.”
13 Even my opponents agree, e.g. Dancy 2000: 3.
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2. Applications
This  section  explains  two  ways  an  ontological  theory  of  reasons 
could affect debates in normative epistemology.
A. Mentalism
According to Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, we best understand 
epistemological internalism as a commitment to this core principle: 
no contingent non-mental factor can help determine whether you 
are epistemically justified in holding any doxastic attitude (Conee 
and Feldman 2001: 57 - 8). They advocate this principle and call 
their view “mentalism.”
Unquestionably your reason for believing something helps de-
termine whether your belief is epistemically justified. Now suppose 
for the sake of  argument that factualism is  the  correct  theory of 
reasons and that Conee and Feldman are correct about internalism. 
But then it follows that internalism is false. For my belief that, say, 
a school bus is parked at the corner is based on the indisputably 
contingent  non-mental  fact  that  a  school  bus  is  parked  at  the 
corner, rendering my belief’s justification dependent on a contin-
gent non-mental fact.
Approaching the matter from a slightly different direction, con-
sider what a factualist would say about Moore’s belief that he has 
two hands. What reason does Moore have that propositionally justi-
fies <I have two hands> for him? (I use angle brackets to name pro-
positions.)  In  other  words,  what  reason  does  Moore  have  that 
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makes  belief the epistemically appropriate attitude for him to take 
toward <I have two hands>? Depending on which version of factu-
alism we consider, it might be the fact that he has two hands, or the 
state  of  affairs  consisting  of  him having  two hands,  or  even  his 
hands themselves. On any of these versions, Moore’s reason is non-
mental and contingent. It is a “plainly external factor” that partly 
determines which doxastic attitude is justified for Moore.
If factualism is true, then mentalism is false.
B. BonJour’s Objection
Laurence BonJour objects to externalism about epistemic justifica-
tion because it  supposedly entails  that a person’s  reasons can be 
“outside  his  cognitive  grasp”  or  “cognitively  unavailable”  to  him 
(BonJour 2003: 24 – 7). But BonJour’s objection appears compel-
ling only if we fail to adequately distinguish the debates between in-
ternalists and externalists on the one hand, and statists and factual-
ists on the other. (A word of caution: BonJour’s (2002: 223) view of 
the  internalism/externalism  dispute  in  epistemology  differs 
markedly from Conee and Feldman’s, so you shouldn’t expect my 
discussion in this subsection to cohere seamlessly with the previous 
subsection’s  claims  or  implications  about  the  nature  of  internal-
ism.)
BonJour attempts to elicit the relevant anti-externalist intuition 
through a vivid description of externalism’s purported essence.
The internalist idea [is] that the justifying reason for 
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[any belief] … must somehow be cognitively available 
to the believer himself, within his cognitive grasp or 
ken. At first glance, the credentials of this idea seem 
quite clear and straightforward: If the belief is to be 
justified  for that particular person (rather than per-
haps for someone else), then it seems at least initially 
obvious that the reason for thinking it to be true must 
be one to which that person himself has access. (Bon-
Jour 2003: 24 – 25; see also BonJour 2002: 222)
“It is this internalist requirement that the justifying reason be cog-
nitively available,”  BonJour explains,  “that  externalist  views pro-
pose to discard.” The externalist’s basic idea: there are “special sorts 
of reasons” that justify belief despite being “cognitively unavailable 
to the person.”
Externalists  who  are  also  statists  (call  them  e-statists)  can 
simply grant “the internalist idea” that all your reasons are readily 
available to you, because on their view reasons are nothing but your 
very own mental states.14 The counterintuitiveness of externalism, 
as BonJour describes it, derives partly from illegitimately wedding 
it to factualism.15 Of course no inaccessible fact could be your reas-
on for believing, because no fact plays that role—mental states do.
14 This  also might  need to involve some restriction on which mental 
states can be reasons. I won’t pursue the details here. 
15 Traces of this can be detected in some of BonJour’s earliest writings 
on the subject. See BonJour 1978: 266 – 269 [Sections III – IV], where 
he criticizes Armstrong’s  externalist  theory of knowledge, and also 
BonJour 1992: 134 – 135.
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E-statists of course accept that external facts sometimes help 
determine the quality of your reason, i.e. whether your reasons are 
good or bad. Some of these facts may well be “unavailable” to you at 
the time (e.g. whether your color vision is reliable in certain condi-
tions). But that doesn’t commit them to saying that those “unavail-
able” facts count as your reasons for believing. Not everything relev-
ant to your belief’s epistemic quality gets counted as one of your 
reasons for holding the belief.16
***
We now shift to the paper’s main arguments. I first address an in-
fluential argument against psychologism (section 3). Then I argue 
against abstractionism and factualism, the two most influential ver-
sions of anti-psychologism (sections 4 and 5). Next I present an ar-
gument for statism, the version of psychologism I advocate (section 
6). Finally I respond to four common concerns (section 7).
3. Psychologism Refuted?17
Many authors distinguish between motivating and normative reas-
16 Huemer (2007: 42 – 8) appears to make a related mistake (ironically, 
in arguing  against BonJour, among others), but in another context 
(2009: 227) goes some way toward dispelling the appearance.
17 Minor terminological note: In what follows, for convenience I often 
use ‘normative’ rather than ‘normative or evaluative’, understand-
ing the normative broadly to include the evaluative. Some prefer to 
reserve  ‘normative’  for  deontological  matters  (e.g.  requirements 
and permissions), and ‘evaluative’ for axiological matters (e.g. good 
and bad).
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ons (e.g. Smith 1994). Insofar as this suggests that motivating reas-
ons are not also normative, it is a serious mistake (Dancy 2000). 
When it comes to epistemic reasons, there are not two sorts of reas-
ons, but rather one sort of thing that plays two roles.  Many of our 
beliefs are based on reasons, and intuitively many of those reasons
—the very same ones that motivate our beliefs—are good. So an ac-
ceptable theory of reasons should respect their normative role. 
Some believe this spells doom for psychologism. Consider the 
following argument suggested by Jonathan Dancy’s  discussion of 
psychologism (Dancy 2000: 102 – 8; see also Miller 2008: 233).
D1. If psychologism is true, then it  is impossible to be-
lieve for a good reason.18 (Premise)
D2. But  it  is  possible  to  believe  for  a  good  reason. 
18 Dancy (2000) discusses “the three-part story,” which proponents of 
psychologism allegedly will tell when trying to reconcile the motiva-
tional and normative dimensions of reasons understood as psycholo-
gical items. The “normative constraint” states that motivating reas-
ons must be capable of being good reasons. In Dancy’s words, the 
normative constraint  “requires that a motivating reason ...  be the 
sort of thing that is capable of being among the reasons in favor of 
so acting; it must, in this sense, be possible to act for a good reason,” 
(p. 103). Dancy then says, “The three-part story fails the normative 
constraint in a very blatant way, for it renders us more or less incap-
able of doing an action for any of the reasons that make it right. It 
makes it impossible, that is, for the reasons why we act to be among 
the reasons in favor of acting,” (p. 103).  Later Dancy extends this 
thought to epistemic reasons: “I have been trying to show that the 
three-part story is committed to the paradoxical claim that it is im-
possible to do an action for the reason that makes it right. As I put it 
earlier, the reasons why we act can never be among the reasons in 
favor of acting if  the three-part  story is  true.  This paradox is even 
more marked in the theory of theoretical reasons (reasons for belief) 
than in the theory of practical reasons,” (p. 105, emphasis added).
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(Premise)
D3. Therefore  psychologism is  not  true.  (From D1  and 
D2)
Skeptics might deny D2, but I won’t. The culprit is D1.  Psycholo-
gism is consistent with a wide variety of views about what makes 
reasons good.
Suppose  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  reasons  are  mental 
states.  And suppose  that  simple  reliabilism provides  a  sufficient 
condition for good reasons: if your mental state M reliably indicates 
that Q, then M is a good reason for you to believe Q. I am presently 
undergoing an experience as of a rectangular surface, which experi-
ence reliably indicates the presence of a rectangular surface before 
me. Based on that experience, I believe that a rectangular surface 
lies before me, and consequently believe for a good reason.
Or suppose that reliability does not suffice for good reasons: 
you must also be aware that M reliably indicates that Q. This fur-
ther condition presents no great difficulty. We can simply add to the 
description of the case that I am aware that my visual experience re-
liably indicates that a rectangular surface lies before me.
Or to take a more unorthodox suggestion, suppose that divine 
command epistemology is correct: M is a good reason for you to be-
lieve  Q  if  and only if God wills  you to believe Q based on M.  I 
presently have an intuition that the existence of unnecessary evil 
precludes God’s existence. God wills that I endorse the content of 
that intuition. I do so and consequently believe for a good reason.
We could multiply examples but the basic point is already clear. 
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Psychologism does not  rule  out  believing for  a  good reason.  But 
then why do some people find D1 plausible?
The mistake derives from conflating “normative reasons” (or 
“normative states of affairs”) with “good reasons.” Consider for ex-
ample how Dancy describes reasons’ normative dimension:
[The normative dimension] requires that a motivating 
reason ... be the sort of thing that is capable of being 
among the reasons in favor of so [believing]; it must, 
in this sense, be possible to [believe] for a good reas-
on. (Dancy 2000: 103)19
But a good reason needn’t comprise  all  the factors contributing to 
its goodness. Consider again our simple reliabilist theory of good 
reasons.  My visual  experience is  a  reliable indication,  and hence 
good reason for me to believe, that a rectangular surface lies before 
me. Much besides my psychology helps make the experience reli-
able, including natural laws connecting the ambient conditions, the 
surface’s reflectance properties, and my visual system’s output. Or 
consider again divine command epistemology. God’s will makes my 
intuition a good reason, but obviously my intuition does not include 
God’s will.
Dancy  and  others  think  that  anti-psychologism holds  an ad-
vantage because it respects the idea “that good reasons can be, or be 
grounded in, considerations other than those concerning the psy-
19 See the previous note for an explanation of the bracketed material. 
Miller 2008: 234 also slides from “normative reasons” to “good reas-
ons.” 
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chology of the agent,” in particular “features of our surroundings” 
(Dancy 2000: 137). But their view enjoys no such advantage. Psy-
chologism’s proponents can fully and consistently endorse the claim 
that non-psychological features of our surroundings contribute to a 
reason’s quality.
We should note an important similarity between Dancy’s and 
BonJour’s discussions. BonJour’s discussion might easily lead us to 
mistake statism’s virtues for internalism’s virtues. Similarly Dancy’s 
discussion might easily lead us to mistake externalism’s virtues for 
factualism’s virtues.
4. Two Problems for Abstractionism
This section presents two problems for abstractionism. But let me 
first say something about what motivates abstractionism.
Abstractionism is attractive, I think, partly because it comple-
ments the view that evidential relations are founded in logical rela-
tions among propositions. If you thought that reasons were propos-
itions,  and you thought,  as  at  least  some leading epistemologists 
do,20 that logical relations determine evidential relations, then your 
ontological theory of reasons would cohere nicely with your theory 
of evidence. Our beliefs would be based on the very same things en-
20 Here I  think of  Fumerton (1995),  who endorses a logical  theory of 
probability as the only plausible response to skepticism, and BonJour 
(2003), who likewise endorses inference to the best explanation as 
the only plausible response. See also Chisholm 1989: 52 and Feldman 
1995.
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tering into evidential relations with one another.  Whether or not 
this motivation ultimately withstands scrutiny,21 I can see how such 
a combination might initially seem attractive
A. The Problem of Circularity22
Suppose I undergo a perceptual experience with the content <here’s 
a rectangular surface>, whereupon I come to believe <here’s a rect-
angular surface>. This seems like a perfectly good way to come to 
know that there’s a rectangular surface before me.
According to abstractionism, in such a case my reason for be-
lieving the proposition <here’s a rectangular surface> is the propos-
ition <here’s a rectangular surface>.23 But this means that in heed-
ing the call of perceptual experience, I am moving in a circle. For if 
<Q> is among your reasons for believing Q, then you are thereby 
moving in a circle. This opens up abstractionism to the charge that 
it invites skepticism about perceptual justification and knowledge.
 But even if we reconcile ourselves to the idea that moving in a 
circle  could  enhance  justification  and  yield  knowledge,  we  still 
ought to reject abstractionism because it entails that to heed the call 
21 Harman 1986 persuasively criticizes the idea that we can read off 
epistemic norms from logical relations among propositions.
22 A referee suggested to me that they’d seen a version of this prob-
lem before. I myself do not recall seeing it discussed. In any event, I 
trust that the ensuing set of objections, responses, replies, etc. helps 
advance the discussion.
23 Strictly speaking I should say, “the proposition <here’s a rectangular 
surface> is  among my reasons for believing <here’s a rectangular 
surface>.” This complication makes no difference to my argument, 
and could be stipulated away if necessary, so I set it aside.
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of experience is to move in a circle. Not a hint of circularity infects 
such a transition.24
Let me precisely state this argument, using the phrase ‘to heed 
the call of experience’ to neutrally express what I would otherwise 
state by saying ‘to believe Q directly on the basis of an experience as 
of Q’. 
1. If  abstractionism  is  true,  then  to  heed  the  call  of 
experience  is  to  believe  Q directly  on the  basis  of  Q 
itself. (Premise)
2. To believe Q directly on the basis of Q itself is to move 
in a circle. (Premise)
3. Therefore if abstractionism is true, then to heed the call 
of experience is to move in a circle. (From 1 and 2)
4. But it is not the case that to heed the call of experience 
is to move in a circle. (Premise)
5. Therefore abstractionism is not true. (From 3 and 4)
The argument is valid so abstractionists will want to reject one or 
more premises.25 
24 Thanks to Eugene Mills for conversation on this point.
25 If the logic of ‘to A is to B’ is not clear enough, we can recast the ar-
gument using conditionals instead.
1. If abstractionism is true, then if  S heeds the call of experience, 
then  S thereby  believes  Q directly  on  the  basis  of  Q itself. 
(Premise)
2. If S (thereby) believes Q directly on the basis of Q itself, then S 
thereby moves in a circle. (Premise)
3. Therefore if abstractionism is true, then if S heeds the call of 
experience, then S thereby moves in a circle. (From 1 and 2)
4. It is not the case that if S heeds the call of experience, then S 
thereby moves in a circle. (Premise)
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Some might deny 1 on the grounds that perceptual content is non-
propositional. If it is non-propositional, then it does not feature <Q>, 
so there’s no danger of circularity. But many abstractionists will want 
to avoid this route (e.g. Brewer 2005). And regardless whether per-
ceptual experience is non-propositional, the same problem arises in 
cases where you believe  Q upon intuiting  Q, because the intuition 
features <Q>.  No one disputes that intuitions have propositional 
content.26 But again, to endorse the content of an intuition is not to 
move in a circle.
Others might deny 1 on the grounds that nothing in the precip-
itating experience’s content exactly matches the perceptual belief’s 
content. You could implement this strategy by arguing that we have 
only a single generic propositional attitude, and treating ‘intuition’ 
in ‘an intuition that Q’ as part of the content. Likewise for ‘belief' in 
‘a belief that Q’, ‘hope’ in ‘a hope that Q’, and ‘perception’ in ‘a per-
ception that Q’, etc. Thus rather than having different kinds of atti-
tude with the same content, we get a single type of attitude with dif-
ferently “colored” content, yielding a content mismatch:the attitude 
that belief-Q would be based on the content <intuition-Q> or <per-
ception-Q>. Clever as it is, this drastic response forces us to relin-
quish the many distinct propositional attitudes featured in folk psy-
chology, which we should avoid if possible. And it is also implaus-
5. Therefore abstractionism is not true. (From 3 and 4)
26 BonJour (2001: 677; 2005: 100) claims that the most fundamental in-
tuitions must have non-propositional  content.  But many retail  intu-
itions undoubtedly have propositional content, which suffices for my 
purpose.
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ible to lump perception in with the propositional  attitudes, as the 
proposal envisions (Millar 1991: Chapter 1).27
Alternatively abstractionists could deny 2. But given 2’s intuit-
ive credentials, this will not be easy. Here abstractionists find help 
from Roy Sorensen (1991),  who denies a closely related principle 
concerning arguments. 
Sorensen argues that at least some arguments of the form ‘Q, 
therefore Q’ are not circular. Consider these examples, inspired by 
Sorensen’s:
(A) Some arguments contain their conclusion as a premise. 
Some arguments contain their conclusion as a premise.
(B) Some sentences contain fewer than seventy-two words. 
Some sentences contain fewer than seventy-two words.
(C) You have considered at least one argument. 
You have considered at least one argument.
Sorensen reasons as follows. Each of A – C is rationally persuasive. 
27 Another move in logical space, available to abstractionists  at this 
point, is less plausible but perhaps worth mentioning. Abstractionists 
could accept that perceptual experience has propositional content 
and accept that the typical perceptual belief that Q is precipitated 
by a perceptual experience as of Q, but nevertheless insist that the 
belief  is  based on  some other  aspect of  the precipitating experi-
ences’s content. Propositional content does not exhaust perceptual 
content—intuitively, there is also raw sensory content—and a typical 
experience will present more than one proposition as true. So for ex-
ample suppose I  believe <here’s  a rectangle>,  precipitated by a 
perceptual experience with the content <here’s a rectangle> and 
also with the content <here’s something>. On the view under con-
sideration,  my  belief  that  here’s  a rectangle might  be based on 
<here’s something> rather than <here’s a rectangle>, thus avoiding 
circularity.  As I  said,  this  is  a  possible  view, but  what motivation is 
there for it?
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Yet each contains the conclusion as a premise. And “no rationally 
persuasive argument is circular.” Therefore A – C are noncircular 
(Sorensen 1991: 248).
We  might  extend  Sorensen’s  reasoning  to  cover  the  mental 
transition from a perceptual experience or intuition that  Q to the 
belief that  Q. Having a perceptual experience (or intuition) that  Q 
rationally persuades us to believe that Q. But moving in a circle nev-
er rationally persuades. Therefore the transition from a perceptual 
experience (or intuition) that Q to a belief that Q does not constitute 
moving in a circle.
Sorensen’s argument’s weak link is the premise that no circular 
argument ever rationally persuades. Sorensen claims this is a  neces-
sary feature of circular arguments (Sorensen 1991: 248). But this 
seems false. An argument could be blatantly circular or subtly circu-
lar.  A subtly and undetectedly circular argument might rationally 
persuade. People we know to be experts might even reassure us that 
the argument is not circular. In such a case the argument could ra-
tionally persuade us. (I wager that with some ingenuity we could cre-
ate  an  actual  situation  like  this  in  nearly  any  introductory  logic 
course.) Circularity does not preclude rational persuasiveness.
B. The Problem of Withholding
I’ll demonstrate this problem with a two-stage example.
First stage: Nevil withholds on the question whether there is 
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unnecessary suffering in the world.28 He also believes that God ex-
ists only if it is false that there is unnecessary suffering in the world. 
The withholding and belief together prompt Nevil to withhold on 
whether God exists.
What are Nevil’s reasons for withholding on whether God ex-
ists? Statists answer: his withholding on whether there is unneces-
sary suffering in the world, and his belief that God exists only if it is 
false that there is unnecessary suffering in the world. True to form, 
abstractionists  answer  that  Nevil’s  reasons  are  the  propositional 
contents of the mental states cited by the statist: the proposition 
<God exists only if it is false that there is unnecessary suffering in 
the world> and the proposition <there is unnecessary suffering in 
the world>. But this makes Nevil sound completely unreasonable: 
surely he ought to  disbelieve that God exists based on those reas-
ons! Yet Nevil  isn’t being unreasonable.  Abstractionism seems to 
yield the wrong verdict here.
Second stage: Now Nevil gets hit on the head, which simul-
taneously knocks him unconscious and causes him to believe that 
there is unnecessary suffering in the world. (Note: Nevil does  not 
think he has been hit on the head and reason from there to the con-
clusion that there is unnecessary suffering in the world; rather, the 
hit  simply  causes  the  belief  through some non-rational  process.) 
Upon waking, Nevil updates his other attitudes accordingly. Now he 
disbelieves that God exists.
28 Where I use ‘withholds’ others may use ‘suspends judgment’ or ‘re-
serves judgment’. These expressions are synonymous.
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What are his reasons for disbelieving that God exists? Statists 
answer: his belief that there is unnecessary suffering in the world, 
and his belief that God exists only if it is false that there is unneces-
sary suffering in the world. Now comes the peculiar part. Abstrac-
tionists again answer that Nevil’s reasons are the proposition <God 
exists only if  it  is false that there is  unnecessary suffering in the 
world> and the proposition <there is unnecessary suffering in the 
world>. In other words, on their view Nevil (in the second stage) 
disbelieves that God exists for the exact same reasons he previously 
(in the first stage) withheld on whether God exists. This result is ex-
tremely counterintuitive.
In  response abstractionists  might  deny that  withholding is  a 
genuine propositional attitude and replace it with special beliefs. So 
instead of  withholding on <there is  unnecessary  suffering in  the 
world> in the first stage, Nevil believes the proposition <it’s unclear 
whether there is unnecessary suffering in the world>. This response 
might handle the example, but at a steep cost: it is implausible on 
phenomenological grounds and it contradicts a broad consensus in 
epistemology that withholding is a genuine propositional attitude, 
one that you are at times required to take toward a proposition (e.g. 
Chisholm 1989, Feldman and Conee 1985, Sosa 1991).
Alternatively abstractionists might look for propositions “in the 
neighborhood” of the originals to serve as Nevil’s reasons. For in-
stance they might say his reasons are propositions about his mental 
states.29 So in the first stage Nevil’s reasons are <I believe that God 
29 Some will  rightly wonder whether this violates the spirit  of anti-psy-
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exists  only  if  it  is  false  that  unnecessary  suffering  exists  in  the 
world> and <I withhold on whether unnecessary suffering exists in 
the world>, while in the second stage they are <I believe that God 
exists  only  if  it  is  false  that  unnecessary  suffering  exists  in  the 
world>  and  <I  believe  that  unnecessary  suffering  exists  in  the 
world>.
But this response fails to address the underlying problem. To 
see why, notice we can stipulate that Nevil lacks the conceptual re-
sources to entertain the proposition <I withhold on whether unne-
cessary suffering exists in the world> because he lacks the concept 
WITHHOLDING. And if he cannot entertain that proposition, then 
it obviously cannot be his reason for holding any doxastic attitude.
5. Two Problems for Factualism
This section presents two problems for factualism. But first I will 
discuss the motivation for factualism. 
Suppose you ask Dick what his reason is for believing that Iraq 
poses a threat to the United States. It would be perfectly natural for 
Dick to respond, “The fact that the intelligence reports say that Iraq 
possesses nuclear weapons.” Similarly in response to the question 
‘What’s your reason for thinking you have hands?’ one natural re-
sponse would be ‘The fact that I do’. Factualists take such talk at 
face value and build a theory of reasons that reflects it, claiming or-
dinary usage as a motivation for their view. But factualists tread on 
chologism. I won’t pursue the matter here.
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dangerous ground here. Unreflective ordinary usage clearly favors 
dualism. We cite as reasons psychological items too. If asked what 
my reason is for thinking that this is the right person for the job, a 
natural response would be ‘My conviction that she is trustworthy’.
Factualism also enables a simple, distinctive response to certain 
forms of skepticism. Factualism says our reasons reach all the way 
out into the non-mental  world, and our beliefs are based on the 
facts themselves rather than some mental item that could have been 
in place even had the facts been radically different. Factualism thus 
provides  for  a  kind  of  infallibilism.  If  your  belief  that  there’s  a 
lectern in front of you is based on the fact that there’s a lectern in 
front of  you,  then given its  basis,  your  belief  couldn’t have been 
false. But of course psychologism itself does not rule out this type 
basis-relative infallibilism. If combined with a strong version of ex-
ternalism  about  mental  content  or  mental  states,  psychologism 
could likewise provide basis-relative infallibility.
A. The Evil Demon Problem
The evil demon problem derives from the previously mentioned in-
tuition that you and your victimized twin each believe <I’m reading 
an epistemology paper> for the same reasons. Factualism runs 
afoul of this intuition, for it is a fact that you’re reading a paper, but 
it is not a fact that Vic is reading one. To state the argument pre-
cisely:
6. If factualism is true, then you and Vic do not believe for 
the same reasons. (Premise)
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7. You and Vic do believe for the same reasons. (Premise)
8. Therefore factualism is not true. (From 6, 7)
But don’t factualists have an easy response? If reasons are men-
tal facts,  then 6 is false because for every mental fact about you, 
there is a matching fact about Vic (as stipulated in the case’s de-
scription). This provides a straightforward sense in which you and 
Vic believe for the same reasons. Yet things are not so simple. Re-
call that factualism is the view that reasons are non-mental facts or 
states  of  affairs.  Factualists  cannot  respond  this  way  without 
abandoning their view. Indeed leading factualists explicitly reject it. 
They say that it  and statism are “unite[d] in opposition” against 
their view (Dancy 2000: 122; see also Collins 1997). In light of the 
motivation for factualism, we can easily see why.
B. The Problem of False Facts
Sometimes “facts” are not really facts. Dick got the facts wrong. The 
intelligence reports  didn’t  say,  as  Dick mistakenly  believes,  “Iraq 
does possess nuclear weapons,” but rather, “Iraq  does not possess 
nuclear weapons.” Dick’s belief cannot be based on the fact that the 
reports say, “Iraq does possess nuclear weapons,” because no such 
fact exists.
Surely factualists don’t want to say that Dick believes what he 
does  for no reason,  because that’s obviously false. But then what 
can factualists say? (Cases of hallucination, where nothing even ap-
proximating the purported fact is around to do the relevant work, rep-
resent the most extreme version of this problem. But nothing so extra-
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vagant is needed to illustrate the point. I want to avoid the impression 
that the problem is endemic to extravagant cases, so I prefer an unre-
markable case of false belief or perceptual error instead.)
One  popular  strategy  is the  appositional  account,  which 
states that reasons are facts  as the subject understands them, or  as 
they seem to the subject (Collins 1997: 120 – 1; Dancy 2000: 110 – 11, 
132 – 5). On this approach, Dick’s reason for believing that Iraq poses 
a threat to the United States is the fact that the intelligence reports say 
that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons, as he understands things. Cru-
cial to this strategy is the claim that the modifier ‘as he understands 
things’ is not, in Arthur Collins’ words, “a shift to the mental realm.” 
yet I’m unable to hear it as anything but that. In a word, it strikes me 
simply as a convoluted way of capitulating to psychologism. It is the 
subject’s understanding of the facts that prompts belief.
Why not just  settle  for the flat-footed response,  according to 
which Dick’s  reason for believing that Iraq poses a threat to  the 
United States is the fact that the intelligence reports said that Iraq 
does not possess nuclear weapons? Because this cure is worse than 
the disease. It makes Dick look flat-out irrational, perhaps incom-
prehensible. (We could of course build up the case so that Dick knew 
the following conditional: Iraq possesses nuclear weapons aimed at 
the United States if and only if the intelligence report says that Iraq 
does not possess nuclear weapons. Perhaps he has excellent evidence 
to suspect that the intelligence community will try to deceive him on 
this matter. Nothing of the sort is true in the present case.) Sometimes 
belief prompted by perceptual error is perfectly reasonable. Much 
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better would be to say that Dick’s reason is his perceptual experi-
ence as of the intelligence report saying so-and-so.
C. Collins’ Argument
Before moving on, I’d like to address an argument due to Arthur 
Collins (1997: esp. 112 – 14, 117 – 18). Collins focuses on reasons for 
action  rather  than  belief,  but  his  discussion  challenges  statism 
across the board.
Collins’s argument is subtle and sometimes elusive but it  ap-
pears to come down to this. Suppose someone asks you why you be-
lieve the ferry is your only option for crossing the river. You sin-
cerely respond, “I believe it because the bridge is closed.” This is the 
factualist explanation: you cite a fact as your reason. In offering it 
you express your belief that the bridge is closed. But suppose you 
had instead responded, “I believe it because I believe that the bridge 
is closed.” This is the statist explanation: you cite a mental state as 
your reason. You must believe the bridge is closed if this explana-
tion  is  correct,  so  in  offering  it  you express  your  belief  that  the 
bridge is closed. The statist explanation commits you to everything 
the factualist one does, in effect merely re-expressing the factualist 
explanation in different words. We might put the point this way: the 
statist explanation is just the factualist explanation in disguise.30
30 Two crucial passages from Collins 1997:
In other words, in the context of reason-giving explana-
tion, the restatement that moves from ‘ . . . because the 
bridge is  closed’,  to ‘  .  .  .  because I  believe that the 
bridge is closed’, does not delete the claim about the 
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The argument commits a mistake. From the fact that the statist 
explanation is correct only if you believe the bridge is closed, it does 
not follow that in offering it you express your belief that the bridge 
is closed. Consider a similar case. You ask Randy why he’s leaving 
the country and he calmly replies, “I’m leaving the country because 
I’m enraged at my father.” His explanation is correct only if he is in 
fact enraged at his father. Yet he does not express his rage by offer-
ing the explanation. We have no reason to treat your explanation 
differently from Randy’s in this respect.
6. An Argument For Statism
Having demonstrated the  competition’s  major  weaknesses,  I  will 
now present what I consider the best argument for statism.
bridge. It  makes that claim, and it adds the qualifying 
admission that making it may be making a mistake. The 
claim made in the explanation is a claim about an ob-
jective  circumstance.  [Your]  restatement  is  not  a  psy-
chologising restatement. [You do] not delete the claim 
about  the  objective  circumstance  made  in  the  un-
restated form. If  [you] deleted that claim [you] would 
drop the explanation that [you] first gave. (113 – 114)
[T]he explanation proffered by ‘[...]  because I  believe 
that p’ absolutely depends on the fact that these words 
do express the speaker’s commitment to the truth of  p. 
The explanation makes the claim about the objective 
circumstance and cannot delete that claim. No formula 
that the speaker could substitute that actually deletes 
this commitment in favor of some other subject matter, 
such as the existence or character of an inner reality in 
the speaker, can convey the right explanation. (118)
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When you believe Q for a reason, the reason explains your be-
lief. Identifying your reason allows us to understand your cognitive 
performance. We seek this explanation by reasons—what I’ll call a 
reasons-explanation—when we ask, “What’s your reason for be-
lieving that?” or “Why does she think that?” Understanding is the 
first step toward evaluating. Of course, understanding might reveal 
that you performed poorly.
Having the relevant mental states in place is necessary for us to 
understand your reasons. Statism’s opponents say that reasons are 
propositions, or facts, or objects, or states of affairs, etc. For it to be 
even remotely plausible that any such thing is your reason for be-
lieving p, some mental state of yours must take it as an object or de-
pict it. If I report that Jeb believes he will win the election because 
he’s ahead in the polls, but Jeb isn’t even aware that he’s ahead in 
the polls, then my report is obviously false.31
Having the relevant mental states in place and appropriately re-
lated is sufficient for us to understand your reasons. To understand 
a person’s  reasons,  all  we need is  for his mental  states—in most 
cases some very small  portion of them—and the relations among 
them to be displayed. Consider Barry. Barry has an ordinary visual 
experience as of a bear in his yard, which in conjunction with his 
habit of taking experience at face value causes him to believe that 
there’s a bear out there. That description allows you to understand 
Barry’s reason.
31 Even statism’s opponents concede this. See Scanlon 1999: 56, Collins 
1997: 121, and Kim 1998: 78.
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Putting those two things together, having the relevant mental 
states in place and appropriately related is both necessary and suf-
ficient for us to understand your reasons.
Statism best explains the striking fact expressed by that bicon-
ditional. If your reasons just are your mental states, then obviously 
having the relevant mental states in place and related in the right 
way is both necessary and sufficient for a reasons-explanation. By 
contrast statism’s competitors claim that some other items are your 
reasons.  But it  is  superfluous to introduce further items into the 
reasons-explanation,  given  that  the  mental  states  are  themselves 
both necessary and sufficient.
Therefore, by inference to the best explanation, statism is true. 
Call this the master argument for statism.
7. Response to Common Concerns
This section responds to four common concerns about statism.
A. Enablers
I encounter a common challenge to the explanatory relevance of the 
subject’s  mental  states.32 The  challenge  begins  by  distinguishing 
items  that  really  do  the  explanatory  work  (the  explanans)  from 
32 James Dreier put the objection to me in conversation. Dancy (2000: 
127 – 128) also presents a version of it, though he expresses only min-
imal  confidence  in  its  prospects.  Hookway  2006  employs  the 
reason/enabler distinction, but in a different way.
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mere background or enabling conditions. This distinction is motiv-
ated  independently  of  the  present  discussion.  Take  one  of  Tiger 
Woods’s clutch putts. His skill and execution explain why the ball 
falls into the cup. Of course the ball would not have fallen into the 
cup had Earth’s gravity weakened significantly, but (the strength of) 
Earth’s gravity merely forms part of the background conditions en-
abling Woods to sink the putt through skill and execution. The chal-
lenge  continues  by  speculating  that  the  subject’s  mental  states 
merely  enable  the  real  reason—be it  a  proposition or some non-
mental fact—to explain the subject’s belief.
We  might  respond  by  rejecting  the  distinction  between  ex-
planans and enabling conditions, on the grounds that any attempt 
at sorting factors into the two categories will involve “capricious” or 
“invidious” discrimination.33 But  I  will  not respond that way.  In-
stead I will grant the distinction’s viability and ask whether the sub-
ject’s mental states behave like enabling conditions in reasons-ex-
planations. Reflecting on our explanatory practices reveals that they 
do not. (Before proceeding, it merits emphasis that my opponents 
have done no more than speculate that the subject’s mental states 
are enabling conditions. No evidence or argument for this claim is 
yet forthcoming.)
Consider the following conversation:
Conversation 1
33 See Mill 1846: 198 and Lewis 1986: 162. Their speak of an analogous 
distinction for causation (background conditions versus causes prop-
er), whereas we focus on the more general notion of explanation.
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A: Why were all Belle’s belongings destroyed?
B: Because a fire broke out in her apartment.
A: Why was there oxygen in her apartment?
Oxygen’s presence is a paradigm case of an enabling condition.34 A’s 
second question would seem odd in  any normal  context.  Had  A 
wanted to better understand why Belle’s belongings were destroyed, 
we might have expected him to ask, “Why was there a fire in her 
apartment?”
Consider also:
Conversation 2
A: Why did the vase break?
B: Because it fell from the window.
A: Why was there a window?
Again the window’s presence is an enabling condition. And again 
A’s second question would sound strange in any normal context be-
cause he’s inquiring directly after an enabling condition. One would 
have expected a question such as, “Why did it fall?”
Now consider this exchange:
Conversation 3
A: Why do you believe that Woods will sink the putt?
B: Because (of the fact that) Woods excels at putting.
A: Why do you believe that he excels at putting?
Here A’s second question sounds perfectly natural (and this despite 
34 Hart and Honore 1985.
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B’s answer being entirely favorable to anti-psychologism). This dis-
tinguishes B’s belief from the enabling conditions mentioned in the 
previous conversations.
One might object  that A’s second question in Conversation 3 
sounds  natural  because  B  asserts that  Woods  excels  at  putting, 
thereby expressing her belief that Woods excels at putting, thereby 
making her belief fair conversational game. A detects this and ques-
tions B accordingly.  This  objection misfires  because we can con-
struct a similar example without B expressing a belief at all.
Conversation 4
A [to C]: Why does B believe that Woods will sink the putt?
C: Because (of the fact that) Woods excels at putting.
A [walks across the hallway to confront B]: Why do you believe 
that Woods excels at putting?
A’s second question again sounds perfectly natural.
Maybe it’s not always odd to inquire directly about an enabling 
condition. It might be perfectly appropriate in certain contexts. But 
that is  beside the point.  Normally it  is  odd.  The subject’s mental 
states do not behave like enabling conditions.35 To encapsulate my re-
35 One might worry, as did an anonymous referee, that my discussion 
presupposes  a theoretical  account  of  the explanans/enabler  dis-
tinction that my opponents will reject. I have three responses to this 
worry. First, my opponents have not indicated that they favor or dis-
favor any particular theoretical account of the distinction—see, e.g., 
Dancy 2000: 127—so this worry is somewhat speculative. Second, to 
fully insure against the presupposition, I could make a weaker point 
and  still  advance  the  dialectic.  My  examples  feature  paradigm 
cases of enabling conditions. The subject’s mental  states are cer-
tainly unlike paradigm cases of enabling conditions, and any ad-
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sponse:
9. If  the  subject’s  mental  states  were  mere  enabling 
conditions,  then normally it  would be odd to inquire 
directly after them. (Premise)
10. But it is not normally odd to inquire directly after them. 
(Premise)
11. Therefore  the  subject’s  mental  states  are  not  mere 
enabling conditions. (From 9 and 10)
B. Twins
Intuitively you and your victimized twin believe what you do for the 
same reasons. Earlier I marshaled this intuition in favor of statism. 
But if reasons are mental states, then you and your twin don’t have 
the same reasons after all:  your mental states belong to you, and 
Vic’s to Vic. Hence this intuition ironically work against statism.
The objection confuses numerical and qualitative senses of ‘the 
same’. When each of two people owns a Volkswagen Beetle, we say 
they own “the same car,” but this obviously means that they own 
qualitative similar cars—i.e. cars of the same kind—not numerically 
equate theory of the distinction should respect this verdict. This does 
not rule out that they form a marginal class of enablers. But there is 
no quick route to my opponents’ goals here, and they will need to 
present  an account  of  the  explanans/enabler  distinction  to  con-
vince us that mental  states do form a marginal  class of enablers. 
Third, grant for the sake of argument that all the points I make here 
presuppose an account of the distinction that my opponents will re-
ject. That in itself does not evince any defect. If my response would 
tend to persuade a neutral  third-party that mental  states are not 
mere enablers, then I shall count it a success.
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one and the same car. Likewise your reasons are not  numerically 
one and the same as your twin’s, but they are exactly similar. You 
have a perceptual experience as of Q, which is your reason for be-
lieving  p;  Vic has a perceptual  experience as of Q, which is Vic’s 
reason for believing Q. You both have the same reason: a perceptual 
experience as of Q.
C. Sharing
It’s a truism that we often share our reasons with one another. Can 
statism do justice to this?
Yes. We can and often do share our thoughts and experiences 
with one another. You ask me what it was like growing up in Detroit 
in the 1980s, and I share some of my experiences with you. I ask 
you whether the Democrats will regain at least one house of Con-
gress in 2006, and you share some of your hopes and expectations 
with me. We share our mental states with one another by express-
ing or depicting them.
D. First-person Perspective
When deliberating with an eye toward reaching a conclusion, we fo-
cus on outward facts and objects but not on our mental states (ex-
cept  in special  cases).36 When adducing his reasons for believing 
that there are external objects, Moore focused on his hands, not his 
beliefs about his hands. He said, “Here is one hand, and here is an-
36  Collins 1997 and Kim 1998.
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other.”37 He didn’t say, “Here is one belief that here’s a hand, and 
here is another.” Surely some deference is due to the phenomeno-
logy of deliberation. But can statists do justice to it?
Yes, by citing the mental states that constitute (the relevant as-
pects of) the subject’s first-person perspective. When Moore says, 
“Here is one hand, and here is another,” he expresses two conscious 
occurrent beliefs, which partly constitute his perspective. In utter-
ing those  words,  he  communicates  his  perspective  to  us.  He  ex-
presses his reasons to us. And of course he expresses his beliefs, not 
his hands.38
37  Moore 1962: 24.
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James Dreier, Mylan Engel, Derek Ettinger, Ben Fiedor, John Greco, 
Stephen Grimm, Allan Hazlett, Jonathan Ichikawa, Ben Jarvis, Chris-
topher Kane, Peter Klein, Clayton Littlejohn, John McDowell, Eugene 
Mills, Alastair Norcross, Bruce Russell, Mark Schroeder (twice?), Ernest 
Sosa, Matthias Steup, James Van Cleve, and two anonymous refer-
ees.  Thanks also to audiences at  the Brown Philosophy Graduate 
Forum in  December  2005 and the Russell  II  Conference in  March 
2006.
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